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1. Introduction 
 Suzy doesn’t really care about getting as much of the good as she can.  She 
sometimes rejects the better for the good enough because the (mere) good enough gets 
her what she really wants.  We can say that Suzy is a satisficer.  Mary, in contrast, does 
care about getting as much of the good as she can.  Nonetheless she sometimes rejects 
the better for the less good because she has a countervailing consideration, i.e., getting 
the better would require her to give up something else she cares about, something that 
is, in some sense, independent of how good her options are.  Perhaps, for example, the 
better choice violates someone’s rights.  We can say that Mary is a motivated 
submaximizer.   
 Satisficing and motivated submaximization, so characterized, are different ways of 
choosing a suboptimal option.  Yet this difference is easily missed.  In fact, defenders 
and detractors of satisficing may, to some extent, be talking past one another.  Putative 
arguments for appropriate “satisficing,” if they are successful at all, tend to support only 
that motivated submaximization can be appropriate.
1
  In contrast, objections to 
satisficing tend to be aimed, not at motivated submaximization, but at what I call 
(radical) satisficing.   
 The purpose of this paper is two-fold: (i) to clarify the distinction between 
(appropriate) motivated submaximization and (appropriate) satisficing and (ii) to show 
that the three most prominent objections to satisficing fail.  The result will be a kind of 
stalemate: I show that currently there are no good arguments for or against the claim 
that satisficing can be appropriate.  I’m sympathetic with satisficing, but a positive 
argument that satisficing can be appropriate must wait for another day. 
 The first two sections of the paper clarify the distinction between satisficing and 
motivated submaximization.  I explicate motivated submaximization in section 2 and 
satisficing in section 3.  The labels here do not matter.  What matters is that we have 
some vocabulary to keep track of the two different ways of choosing a suboptimal 
option.  If you prefer to think of motivated submaximization as a type of satisficing, 
then let my use of satisficing be shorthand for radical satisficing.
2
 
 The remaining sections of the paper consider arguments for and against the claim 
that satisficing can be appropriate.  In section 4, I explain why the existing justifications 
for choosing a suboptimal option justify motivated submaximization, but not satisficing.  
In sections 5, 6, and 7, I consider and disarm the three most prominent objections to 
satisficing.  Sections 5 and 6 are especially important, because they construct a 
vocabulary that allows us to understand and track the differences between appropriate 
motivated submaximization and appropriate satisficing.   This discussion will lead us to 
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 I tend to use the term appropriate and its cognates (rather than rational or morally permissible and their 
cognates), because nothing in this paper hinges on the difference between moral and rational evaluation.   
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refine our understanding of countervailing consideration, but until then, you can rely on 
your intuitive understanding of the term. 
 
2. Motivated Submaximization 
 Satisficing and motivated submaximization are kinds of submaximization.  An agent 
submaximizes iff she chooses an option when she had a better option.  In other words, 
you submaximize when you choose a suboptimal option, an option not as good as one 
of your other options.  Ignorance can lead to appropriate submaximization.  When you 
don’t know what all of your options are, the best option that you are aware of may not 
be your best option overall.  In such a case, the consensus is that you can appropriately 
choose the best option that you are aware of, provided that the option is “good enough” 
(Petit 1984: 166–7; Schmidtz 1995: 29–30; Byron 1998: 71–4; Richardson 2004: 106).  
Perhaps submaximization can also be appropriate when you reasonably but mistakenly 
think you are choosing the best option.  I set aside such epistemic excuses by focusing 
on a special kind of choice situation. 
 It is convenient to assume that, at any given time, an agent has a determinate list of 
options.  The individuation of options is controversial business, but the rough idea is 
that the agent’s options capture states of affairs that can be brought about by the agent 
in those circumstances.
3
  Sometimes one of your options may be to search for more 
options.  If you are trying to decide whether to accept an offer on your home, one of 
your options may be to wait and see if other offers come in.  But if you do have the 
option to wait, that option will be evaluated along with all other options.  It might be 
your best option, your worst, or something in between.   
 A’s situation is transparent iff (i) A knows precisely what A’s options are, and (ii) 
A knows the ranking of all A’s options.  Transparent situations ensure that, if the agent 
chooses an option that is suboptimal, then she does so with full knowledge.  In 
transparent situations, a choice for less than the best is never made in ignorance.  
Epistemic excuses don’t apply. 
 We can get a handle on what I call motivated submaximization by considering the 
most plausible and widely held explanations for why submaximization (in a transparent 
situation) can be appropriate.  It is relatively uncontroversial that submaximization is 
appropriate whenever there is some countervailing consideration that motivates it.  I 
will briefly discuss four of the most familiar motivations for submaximization.    
 The first motivation concerns Ever Better Situations.  In these cases, one has no 
optimal option because, for every option one can choose, there is another better.  
Suppose that a genie offers to ensure that your life enjoys any degree of well-being you 
choose.  Since there is no maximum degree of well-being that you can enjoy, for every 
degree of well-being you can have, you could have some degree higher.  Sorenson 
(2006: 214) contends that the lack of an optimal option guarantees that your choice is 
irrational.  While there is something to be said for Sorenson’s position, it has seemed 
intuitively obvious to many philosophers that, in Ever Better Situations, you can 
rationally choose some arbitrarily high degree of well-being for yourself (e.g., Pollock 
1983: 417-8; Schmidtz 1995: 42-45, 2004: 41-4; Slote 1989: 110-23; and Langtry 2008: 
74-8).    
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 Those in the satisficing literature often take controversial stands as to what counts as an option.  For 
some examples, see Pettit and Brennan (1986: 440-1); Slote (1989: 24-5), and Henden (2007: 340, nt 1).   
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 A second motivation for submaximization concerns your special connection or 
relationship with specific individuals (Cottingham 1986; Hurka and Shubert 2012; 
Scheffler 2010; Vallentyne 2006: 25; and van Roojen 2004: 170).  Suppose you have 
two options, A and B.  A best promotes the well-being of your family while also 
making everyone else better off than they otherwise would have been.  B is good, 
though not as good, for your family; it does, however, best promote the well-being of 
everyone else.  One might agree that B is the best option overall since it provides the 
greatest benefit to the greatest number but then deny that one must choose it: your 
special connection to your family makes it appropriate for you to choose A even though 
you recognize it is less than the best.
4
  This motivation, like the first, is compatible with 
aiming at as much good as one can get.  The person who appropriately chooses 
suboptimal A might aim at doing the greatest good for the greatest number.  Yet, when 
this aim conflicts with her aim of doing the greatest good for her family, she can 
appropriately choose less than the best.  Even critics of this position recognize that it is 
plausible enough to be part of “ordinary, commonsense morality” (e.g., Kagan 1989: xi, 
2–3). 
 A third motivation for submaximization concerns incommensurability.  Suppose 
goods G1 and G2 are incommensurable.  Option 1 best promotes G1 and is very good 
with respect to G2.  Option 2 is very good with respect to G1 and best promotes G2.  
Since G1 and G2 are incommensurable, there is no broader perspective from which we 
can say that one of the options is overall better than the other (or even that they are 
equally good).  Suppose I choose Option 1.  I thereby choose an option that is 
suboptimal with respect to G2.  I might make this choice even though I aim at getting as 
much of G2 as I can; I just accept a suboptimal amount of G2 because I have a 
competing aim, namely that I’m also aiming to get as much of G1 as I can.  Those who 
appeal to incommensurability to justify submaximization include Schmidtz (1995: 45-
50; 2004: 44-8), Richardson (2004), and Weber (2004).   
 A fourth motivation concerns deontological side constraints on the promotion of 
goodness (Vallentyne 2006: 28-33; van Roojen 2004: 170).  For example, I might aim 
at doing the greatest good for the greatest number but nonetheless choose a suboptimal 
option because it is the best option that doesn’t violate anyone’s rights.   
 We’ve identified, in this section, four widely held motivations for submaximization.  
If we pay careful attention to the four motivations, we can see that each of them has a 
common structure.  Each motivation is compatible with the agent’s aiming at as much 
of the good as she can get.  What made choosing a suboptimal option plausibly 
appropriate in the above cases is that there were independent considerations that 
conflicted with that aim; there were countervailing considerations that (allegedly) made 
choosing a suboptimal option appropriate.  Let’s use the following term to capture this 
shared feature: 
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 Objection: the special connection with your family should be factored in when we evaluate options.  
Once it is factored in, A is better than B.  Reply: the objection presupposes a particular axiology that isn’t 
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Motivated Submaximization: an agent A submaximizes with motivation in a 
transparent situation iff  
(a) A aims at getting as much of good G as A can, but  
(b) A chooses a suboptimal option with respect to G because of some 
countervailing consideration. 
Each of the above motivations for choosing a suboptimal option counts a different kind 
of motivated submaximization that is widely thought to be appropriate.  It’s popular, 
then, to hold that motivated submaximization can be appropriate.    
 
3. Satisficing 
 Satisficing, as I define it, is a type of unmotivated submaximization (cf. Pettit 1984: 
174).  One submaximizes without motivation iff she chooses a suboptimal option but 
not because she is motivated by some countervailing consideration.  Don’t read too 
much into the distinction between motivated and unmotivated submaximization.  The 
distinction is shorthand for, roughly, ‘submaximization motivated by countervailing 
considerations’ and ‘submaximization not motivated by countervailing considerations’, 
respectively.  When I say that some choice is unmotivated, I’m not denying that it is 
motivated by reasons; I’m denying that it’s motivated by reasons of a special sort, 
namely reasons that countervail other reasons.  It will become clear, especially in 
section 6, that appropriate satisficing always involves reasons of a certain kind. 
 To satisfice is to act with a certain aim, which distinguishes satisficing from both 
motivated submaximization and unmotivated submaximization more generally.  One 
doesn’t satisfice insofar as one aims at the best or getting as much of the good as one 
can.  One doesn’t satisfice if she chooses the good enough for no reason whatsoever.  
To satisfice is to choose a suboptimal option because one is aiming to promote some 
good to degree D but not as much as one can. 
 To promote some good to degree D is to take the necessary means of bringing 
about a degree at least as high as D.  If an agent aims at promoting G1 to degree D 
when D is something like as much as I can get or is the most possible, let us say that the 
agent aims at the optimum.  If an agent aims at promoting G1 to degree D when D is 
something short of the optimum, let us say that the agent aims at the good enough.  
Optimizers aim at the optimum and satisficers aim at the good enough.  Their aims are 
common insofar as they aim at the promotion of value.  Their aims are distinct insofar 
as they aim at differing degrees of value. 
 Satisficing, then, involves choosing a suboptimal option because it realizes one’s 
aim at the good enough.  Yet if we want to capture an interesting and controversial 
notion of satisficing, we must impose further conditions on the aim at the good enough.  
Suppose I’m aiming only at a good enough degree of momentary well-being because I 
know doing so will maximize my overall well-being.  Even self-proclaimed critics of 
satisficing allow choosing the suboptimal option as a means to optimizing some other 
good to be appropriate (e.g., Byron 1998: 80-1; Richardson 2004).  So our conception 
of satisficing must add that the aim is taken for its own sake. 
 Even with this constraint we have not captured a type of choice that is particularly 
controversial.  Some ends are more final than others.
5
  As Pettit and Brennan (1986) 
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 Richardson (2004: 119-23 and nt 40 on pg 129) provides some helpful discussion concerning how ends, 
or aims, can be arranged in a hierarchy, with some ends being more final than others. 
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argue, I might aim at the good enough for its own sake as a way of aiming at the 
optimum for its own sake.  My ultimate aim in life might be to get as much of the good 
as I can.  I then might learn that I can achieve this aim only if I develop the habit of 
aiming at the good enough for its own sake.  I might develop such a habit.  I’m not 
satisficing if I then choose a suboptimal option because it realizes my aim at the good 
enough.  Satisficing requires that one aim at the good enough purely for its own sake, 
that it not be a means to any further aim.  In other words, one’s end of the good enough 
must be an ultimate, or purely final, end (cf. Slote 2004: 17-18).
6
 
 I now present the official definition of satisficing: 
 
Satisficing (with respect to good G1): an agent A satisfices with respect to G1 in 
a transparent situation iff: 
(a) A aims, purely for its own sake, at promoting G1 to degree D but not as 
much as A can, and 
(b) A chooses a suboptimal option with respect to G1 that has a value greater 
than or equal to D because A knows it satisfies the aim in (a). 
 
This notion of satisficing is relativized to good G1.  If there is more than one (intrinsic) 
good—for example, if both well-being and beauty are intrinsic goods—the 
relativization allows that one satisfices with respect to good G1 without satisficing with 
respect to good G2.  A transparent situation, recall, is one in which an agent knows 
what her options are and how to rank them.  The agent who satisfices in a transparent 
situation knowingly rejects the better for the good enough. 
 To accuse someone of satisficing, then, is to accuse them not only of rejecting the 
better for the good enough, but also of having a certain motivational structure.  The 
satisficer aims at promoting the good to some suboptimal degree purely for its own 
sake.  She chooses the good enough because it realizes this aim.  The motivated 
submaximizer has a different motivational structure.  She aims at promoting the good as 
much as she can.  She chooses a suboptimal option, because she has some special 
consideration or competing aim that motivates the choice to reject the better for the 
good enough. 
 Some of those who claim to defend the appropriateness of satisficing in some 
interesting sense do not defend the appropriateness of this sort of satisficing (e.g., 
Dreier 2004; Greenspan 2009; Narveson 2004; van Roojen 2004: 170-1; and Weber 
2004: 98).  In such cases, these theorists usually defend the appropriateness of only 
some sort of motivated submaximization.  Even classic defenses of satisficing, such as 
Slote’s 1989 and Swanton’s 1993, fail to count as defenses of satisficing in my sense.  
They defend something much closer to motivated submaximization, and Slote (1989) 
seems to endorse the first objection to satisficing discussed below (see sec 5).
7
 Putative 
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defenses of satisficing are almost always defenses of motivated submaximization (or 
something in that neighborhood).
8
 
 
4. The Greater Plausibility of Motivated Submaximization 
 Now that we understand the difference between satisficing and motivated 
submaximization, we can evaluate these types of choice.  There are several widely 
endorsed justifications for motivated submaximization, and so it’s plausible that 
motivated submaximization can be appropriate.  On the other hand, there are no existing 
arguments that justify satisficing.  The arguments that have been furnished on 
satisficing’s behalf are better construed as arguments for the appropriateness of 
motivated submaximization.  Or, at best, these arguments show only that either 
satisficing or motivated submaximization can be appropriate.  
 Recall from section 2 that motivated submaximization is supported by the four most 
popular justifications for knowingly choosing a suboptimal option, namely the absence 
of an optimal option, special connections to specific individuals, incommensurability, 
and deontological side constraints.  In contrast, there are no existing arguments that 
provide support for the appropriateness of satisficing.  Consider, first, why the four 
considerations that allegedly justify motivated submaximization cannot justify 
satisficing. 
 Satisficing involves aiming at the good enough, and it’s doubtful that the relevant 
considerations provide a reason to have such an aim.  For example, a reason to prioritize 
my family’s well-being over global well-being is not a reason to aim at the good enough 
with respect to global well-being.  One aim can be prioritized over another even if both 
aims concern the optimum for some good.  Furthermore, even if you think that these 
considerations do provide some reason to aim at the good enough, they do not provide a 
reason to aim at the good enough purely for its own sake.  If a side constraint against 
torture gives me reason to aim at the good enough with respect to overall well-being, it 
does not give me reason to aim at the good enough purely for its own sake.  Rather, it is 
for the sake of the side constraint that I ought to aim at the good enough.  More 
generally, since each one of these four considerations is distinct from the good to be 
promoted, they apparently can’t serve as reasons to aim purely for its own sake at any 
particular degree of the good, whether it be at the good enough or the optimum. 
 Supererogation is regularly discussed in connection with satisficing (e.g., Rogers 
2010; Slote 1989: 29; Vallentyne 2009: 27-8). If supererogation is possible, then it is 
possible to appropriately and knowingly reject a better option for one that is good 
enough.  It does not follow, however, that one can appropriately and knowingly reject a 
better option for one that is good enough even if one lacks a countervailing 
consideration.  The mere possibility of supererogation does not show us that it might be 
appropriate to reject the better for the good enough because one aims purely for its own 
sake at the good enough.  At most, the possibility of supererogation would show us that 
either satisficing or motivated submaximization can be appropriate.  It does not provide 
any reason to think that satisficing, in particular, can be appropriate. 
 Slote discusses cases in which it seems that one can appropriately choose a 
suboptimal option (e.g., appropriately rejecting a beneficial snack, appropriately 
accepting a less than maximal offer on one’s home) and these cases are sometimes 
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thought to provide support for satisficing.  In their current form, however, they support 
the idea that either satisficing or motivated submaximization is appropriate.
9
  Indeed, 
Slote himself interprets these examples as justifying something much closer to 
motivated submaximization than satisficing.
10
 
 Motivated submaximization has a lot going for it and, so far, satisficing has nothing 
going for it.  Yet I write as satisficing’s advocate, not its accuser.  My goal in the rest of 
the paper is to provide a limited defense of satisficing.  I will clarify the commitments 
of appropriate satisficing and, thereby, show that the three most prominent objections to 
appropriate satisficing are failures.   
 
5. The Insufficient Reason Objection 
 
5.1. The Objection 
 The Insufficient Reason Objection may be the most widely endorsed objection to 
satisficing.  Even Slote may endorse it.  Its first premise is:   
Sufficiency: Whenever option O1 is better than a “good enough” alternative O2, 
we have some reason to choose O1 over O2.   
Slote (1989: 39) endorses this premise when he holds that we have a “standing reason” 
to choose the best.  More generally, Sufficiency is very popular especially among critics 
of satisficing.
11
   
 The second premise is: 
Necessity: When one has a reason to choose O1 over O2, one’s choice for O2 is 
appropriate only if one has a countervailing consideration.   
Slote (1989: 22) seems to have Necessity in mind when he maintains that the moderate 
agent chooses the best, other things being equal.  Even if Slote doesn’t endorse 
Necessity, it too is very popular among critics of satisficing.
12
 
 The conjunction of these two premises entails that satisficing, in the sense 
explicated in this paper, is necessarily inappropriate.  According to Sufficiency, having 
better options is sufficient to have a reason to choose those options over the less good 
ones.  When you have reason to choose the better options, Necessity says that you need 
a countervailing consideration to appropriately choose a less good option.  The 
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conjunction of Sufficiency and Necessity entails, therefore, that choosing a suboptimal 
option is appropriate only when one has a countervailing consideration.  Satisficing, 
given this conjunction, is necessarily inappropriate.  For when an agent satisfices, she 
chooses a suboptimal option because O2 realizes her aim at the good enough, not 
because she has a countervailing consideration. 
 
5.2. My Reply 
 I endorse Sufficiency, the claim that if O1 is better than O2, then we have some 
reason to choose O1 over O2.  The objection fails, because we can reasonably resist 
Necessity, the claim that when one has a reason to choose O1 over O2, it is appropriate 
to choose O2 only if one has a countervailing consideration.  To understand why, we 
need to consider the distinction between requiring and justifying strength.   
 A reason has requiring strength with respect to choosing option O iff it makes not 
choosing O pro tanto inappropriate.  A choice is pro tanto inappropriate iff it is 
inappropriate in the absence of (sufficiently strong) countervailing considerations.  The 
fact that some surgery would cause me great pain is a reason that pro tanto requires me 
not to have the surgery.  In other words, the great pain is a reason that makes it pro tanto 
inappropriate to have the surgery.  This pro tanto requirement fails to be an all things 
considered requirement iff there are relevant countervailing considerations, e.g., the 
surgery is the only way to save my life.  In the absence of countervailing considerations, 
it is inappropriate to ignore reasons with requiring strength. 
 A reason has justifying strength with respect to choosing some option O iff it has 
the power to make choosing O pro tanto appropriate.  A choice is pro tanto 
appropriate iff it is appropriate in the absence of countervailing considerations with 
(sufficiently strong) requiring strength.  The benefit of eating the snack has justifying 
strength, it is a reason that makes it pro tanto appropriate to eat the snack.  This pro 
tanto appropriateness fails to be all things considered appropriateness iff I have relevant 
countervailing considerations with requiring strength, e.g., if eating the snack would 
leave my hungry child with nothing to eat.
13
 
 I assume, though nothing hinges on this, that to be a reason is to have justifying 
strength.  In other words, R is a reason to choose O iff R makes it pro tanto appropriate 
to choose O.
14
  It does not follow that all reasons have requiring strength.  That is, it 
does not follow that all reasons to choose O make it pro tanto inappropriate to not 
choose O.  A merely justifying reason for choosing O is a reason that makes it pro 
tanto appropriate to choose O but does not make it pro tanto inappropriate to not choose 
O.  Merely justifying reasons pro tanto justify without pro tanto requiring a choice.  As 
such, they can be appropriately ignored even in the absence of countervailing 
considerations.  That’s just what it is to be a reason that pro tanto justifies but does not 
pro tanto require.  The existence of such reasons is, as you might expect, controversial.   
 The proponents of the Insufficient Reason Objection deny that such reasons exist.  
This shouldn’t come as a surprise, since this denial follows from Necessity.  If a reason 
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can’t pro tanto justify choosing O1 unless it pro tanto requires it, then countervailing 
considerations are always needed to appropriately choose an alternative option O2.  
 The proponents of the Insufficient Reason Objection treat the impossibility of 
merely justifying reasons as some obvious axiom of rationality that needs no defense.  
In the satisficing literature, the most impressive defense of this denial is (not joking) 
Kagan’s (1989: 380-1) remarks that it is “hard to imagine” and “hard to understand” 
how a reason could be merely justifying.
15
  At least he recognizes that there is an issue 
here.  Yet merely justifying reasons are neither hard to understand nor hard to imagine.  
What we have is two distinct roles: a role of making something pro tanto appropriate 
and a role of making something pro tanto inappropriate.  It is easy to understand what it 
means for one thing to play the former role without playing the latter.  And, as the 
forthcoming discussion shows, it is easy to imagine something playing the former role 
without playing the latter one.  Gert’s work is also relevant here.  He (2007a, 2016) 
vigorously defends the idea that justifying strength can outstrip requiring strength, and 
he also occasionally argues for the stronger claim that there are merely justifying 
reasons, reasons that justify without having any requiring strength at all (Gert 2000).   
 What the proponent of the Insufficient Reason Objection needs—and does not 
have—is an argument that nothing can play a pro tanto justifying role without its also 
playing a pro tanto requiring role.  Or at the very least, he needs some reason to deny 
that the two roles come apart in the way that is required to vindicate satisficing.
16
  Since 
the objector doesn’t have such an argument, they provide no reason to believe their key 
premise, Necessity, and their objection fails.  My goal in the rest of this section is to 
articulate what I take to be the central theoretical claim of those who hold that 
satisficing can be appropriate.  If what I call Asymmetry is this central theoretical claim, 
then the Insufficient Reason Objection has an even more serious problem. 
 Assume that merely justifying reasons exist.  Gert (2007a: 535) argues that the 
existence of such reasons would disprove satisficing theories of rationality.  The actual 
connection is nearly the opposite of what Gert suggests: the existence of merely 
justifying reasons is necessary—but not sufficient—for appropriate satisficing.  
Consider, for example, a view that grants that we each have a merely justifying reason 
to pursue our own projects, regardless of whether these pursuits would bring about the 
most good (cf. Kamm 1996: 230; Scheffler 1982, ch 3).  These merely justifying 
reasons would countervail the reasons provided by overall goodness.  Such a view 
allows a kind of motivated submaximization to be appropriate without allowing 
satisficing to be appropriate.   
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coherence constraints on rationality (see my nt 14 above).  Even if one could permissibly have been in 
either of two states (e.g., preferring suboptimal option A or preferring optimal option B), it can be 
irrational and incoherent to be in both states at once (cf. Goldman 2012: 36, sec 5).  For a different reply, 
see Gert 2007b. 
10 
 To get appropriate satisficing, merely justifying reasons must interact in a specific 
way with pro tanto requiring reasons.  To get the right kind of interaction, I propose:   
Asymmetry: Where O1 is a better option than O2, 
(a) if O2 is not good enough, then the betterness of O1 both pro tanto requires 
and pro tanto justifies choosing O1 over O2;  
(b) if O2 is good enough, then the betterness of O1 is a merely justifying reason 
to choose O1 over O2.  
For the purposes of the paper, we can say an option is good enough iff, in that option, 
the agent is well-off, or flourishes.  Given this assumption, Asymmetry holds that we 
are pro tanto justified in taking every available improvement to well-being, but we are 
pro tanto required to take only those improvements that we need to be well-off.  There 
is, therefore, an asymmetry in what our well-being pro-tanto justifies and what it pro-
tanto requires: it pro-tanto justifies far more choices than it pro tanto requires.
17
   
 If Asymmetry is true, then Necessity is false.  Necessity is the claim that when O1 is 
better than O2, one can appropriately choose O2 only if one has a countervailing 
consideration.  In contrast, Asymmetry claims that when O2 is good enough, one’s 
reason to choose O1 over O2 is merely justifying.  Merely justifying reasons can be 
appropriately ignored.  Hence, one can have a merely justifying reason to prefer O1 
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 Although nothing hangs on how generous we are in using the labels “satisficing” or “satisficing theory” 
(recall the introduction), here is a brief explanation of why Asymmetry should count as satisficing theory 
and, insofar as a theory allows for appropriate motivated submaximization, it probably should not count 
as a satisficing theory.  It is generally agreed that, to count as “satisficing theory,” a theory must make 
sense of this idea: choosing a suboptimal option can be appropriate because the option is good enough 
(cf. Henden 2007: 347; van Roojen 2004: 169-70; Weber 2004: 98).  Asymmetry makes sense of this 
idea.  The good pro tanto demands that we pursue the good up to a certain point, and this point sets the 
threshold for the good enough.  When I choose an option that meets or surpasses this threshold, the good 
pro tanto justifies my choice and does not pro tanto require that I choose an alternative option.  In the 
absence of countervailing considerations, my choice is appropriate.  Had the option failed to be good 
enough, the good would have pro tanto required that I choose an alternative.  In the absence of 
countervailing considerations, my choice would have been inappropriate.  Hence, Asymmetry makes 
sense of the relevant idea, namely that choosing a suboptimal option can be appropriate because the 
option is good enough.   
 van Roojen (2004) and Weber (2004) argue that their defenses of motivated submaxization deserve 
the label “satisficing theory,” precisely because appropriate motivated submaximization can make sense 
of the relevant idea.  For example, van Roojen (2004: 170) holds that the constraint against torture 
justifies enduring some loss of the good but not a “calamity”.  He infers that his view makes sense of the 
relevant idea.  I’m skeptical of this inference.  What he makes sense of is the idea that one can choose a 
suboptimal option because the countervailing consideration is strong enough.  Suppose that there are 
potential countervailing considerations of various strengths.  The constraint against lying, say, justifies a 
loss of up to 10 units whereas the constraint against torture justifies a loss of up to 100 units.  One can 
say, of course, that giving up 50 units of the good for the sake of telling the truth involves choosing an 
option that is not “good enough,” whereas giving up 50 units to avoid torture involves choosing an option 
that is “good enough”.  But here what counts as being good enough is determined by the strength of the 
relevant countervailing consideration: the constraint against torture is strong enough to justify that loss, 
but the constraint against lying isn’t strong enough.  Hence, in appropriate motivated submaximization 
it’s not clear that being good enough plays a genuine, non-redundant explanatory role in making the 
choice appropriate. 
 In sum, the contrast is as follows.  Insofar as a choice is appropriate satisficing, it is appropriate 
because the chosen option is good enough.  Insofar as a choice is appropriate motivated submaximization, 
it is appropriate because the relevant countervailing consideration is strong enough. 
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over O2 and appropriately choose O2 even in the absence of countervailing 
considerations.
18
  
 If Asymmetry does capture the central theoretical claim of those who hold that 
satisficing can be appropriate, then the failure to adequately defend Necessity is even 
more serious than I first suggested.  For then, the objectors’ assumption of Necessity 
just is the assumption that satisficing can’t be appropriate.  So understood, the 
Insufficient Reason Objection is arguably a textbook case of begging the question, of 
assuming that which one aims to prove.   
 
6. Satisficing, Reasons, and Countervailing Considerations 
 Bradley (2006: 105) will complain that to allow satisficing to be appropriate is to 
permit “doing a suboptimal act [that] is completely gratuitous”.  That is, “there is just 
no reason not to do what is best” (105).  It is left implicit that, without such a reason, 
not choosing the best is inappropriate.  Call this the No Reason Objection.  My 
response to this objection will be quick; the main work is to show that the resulting 
account of appropriate satisficing remains distinct from appropriate motivated 
submaximization.  
 
6.1. Countervailing Considerations 
 First a quibble: I haven’t claimed that an agent can appropriately perform a 
suboptimal act or make a suboptimal choice.  I claimed that an agent can choose a 
suboptimal option.  I think it can be misleading to refer to acts and choices as 
suboptimal or best (cf. Gert 2000: 237-9, 2007a).   
 More to the point: on my view, when one satisfices appropriately, there is a reason 
to reject (i.e. not choose) the best.  On the conception of reasons I’m working with, R is 
a reason for choosing option O iff R pro tanto justifies choosing O.
19
 The goodness of 9 
million units of well-being is a very strong reason—a very strong pro tanto 
justification—to choose any option that involves that much well-being.  And it can’t 
(pro tanto) justify choosing any such option unless it (pro tanto) justifies rejecting all of 
the other available alternatives.  When I can choose between an option with 9 million 
units and one with 9 million and 1, the goodness of the suboptimal option is a reason 
that justifies forgoing the best.  Appropriate satisficing, then, involves reasons that 
justify choosing the (mere) good enough and justify rejecting the best.  Hence, 
Bradley’s objection fails. 
 At this point, the distinction between appropriate satisficing and appropriate 
motivated submaximization may seem obscure.  Let’s clarify it.  Recall that satisficing 
is a type of unmotivated submaximization.  To say that some submaximization is 
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 Vallentyne (2006: 24) and Russell (2013) endorse something like this response.  I think Gert may be 
committed to something like Asymmetry, but he doesn’t explicitly endorse it.  Vallentyne cites Kamm 
(1996, ch 8) as endorsing his version.  While Kamm (230-1) mentions Kagan’s discussion of something 
like Asymmetry, she doesn’t seem to endorse it.  What she endorses is the idea that our autonomy can 
generate a personal prerogative—a merely justifying reason to prefer one’s own projects—that 
countervails considerations of well-being.  As mentioned previously, such a view endorses the existence 
of merely justifying reasons without thereby endorsing the appropriateness of satisficing. 
19
 If you think that a consideration can justify without being a reason, then what really matters is that we 
have a consideration that justifies not choosing the best.  If that consideration fails to count as a reason, 
then we don’t need a reason to reject the best. 
12 
unmotivated is to say that it isn’t motivated by countervailing considerations (sec 3).  
The key question, then, is this: if appropriate satisficing involves a reason to reject the 
best, then why doesn’t this reason countervail our reason to choose the best?  
Countervailing considerations operate independently of and against what they 
countervail.
20
  When one satisfices appropriately, one’s reason to reject the best is, in 
the relevant senses, neither independent of nor against one’s reason to choose the best.   
 A reason R1 is against choosing option O1 only if, in that situation, R1 does not 
justify choosing O1.  While the acquisition of 9 million units of well-being can justify 
choosing a suboptimal option (and so justify not choosing the best), it also can justify 
choosing the best.  After all, the best option also exemplifies 9 million units of well-
being—and one more unit besides.   
 There is nothing fishy here.  Any theory that allows there to be Buridan’s ass 
cases—cases in which an agent’s overall reason justifies choosing either of two 
options—also allows there to be cases in which the same reason justifies both choosing 
and rejecting an option.  Consider, for example, a crude sort of utilitarianism.  On such 
a view, the appropriateness of a choice is determined entirely by the amount of total 
well-being contained in one’s options and it does not matter how that well-being is 
distributed across people.  Suppose that I have only three options.  They are comparable 
in every respect except as follows.  In O1, I benefit no one.  In O2, I give Joe 50 units of 
well-being.  In O3, I give Jack 50 units of well-being.  Presumably, I can appropriately 
choose either O2 or O3.  Remember that, on this crude utilitarianism, the distinction 
between persons does not matter.  The exact same reason that justifies me in choosing 
O2—that it leads to an increase of 50 units of total well-being—also justifies me in 
choosing O3.  Since this reason justifies choosing O2, it justifies me in rejecting O3.  
Nonetheless, since this reason also justifies choosing O3, it also justifies me in rejecting 
O2.  Buridan’s ass cases suggest, then, that a reason can justify both choosing and 
rejecting the very same option (while also justifying both choosing and rejecting an 
alternative).  
 If reason R2 countervails reason R1, then there is a minimal sense in which R2 must 
be independent of R1.  Reason R2 is minimally independent of reason R1 only if R2 is 
constituted, at least in part, by something that does not constitute reason R1.  Let R2 be 
the 9 million units that justifies choosing the really great suboptimal option and let R1 
be the 9 million and 1 units that justifies choosing the best.  Given this very minimal 
conception of independence, R2 is not independent of R1.  Indeed, R1 consists in 
everything R2 consists in and 1 more unit besides.  My reason to choose the really great 
suboptimal option is not minimally independent of my reason to choose the best.   
 If we reserve countervailing considerations for those reasons that have both 
againstness and minimal independence, then the term allows us to track the following 
structural differences. Let “R”, “R1”, and “R2” represent reasons, while “B” and “E” 
represent distinct options. 
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 I inherit these terms from Slote’s (1989, esp ch 2) discussion of the moderate agent, but I develop them 
in my own way. 
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Figure 1 depicts the structure involved in appropriate satisficing and Buridan’s ass cases.  
Let’s focus on the former by letting “B” represent the best option and “E” an excellent 
suboptimal option.  (To represent standard Buridan’s ass cases, both B and E need to be 
optimal options).  The same reason justifies both choosing and rejecting each option, B and E.  
It’s somewhat odd to think of the reason as countervailing itself.  It’s more natural to think of 
it as a reason that grants you some moral and rational freedom: a single reason makes more 
than one option choiceworthy. 
 Figure 2 depicts the structure involved in, say, the sort of Kammian motivated 
submaximization mentioned previously.  One has a reason to choose the best option—it is the 
best after all.  Yet, if choosing the best option requires one to pass up significant opportunities 
to pursue one’s deeply held projects, then those projects provide a reason to choose a 
suboptimal option.  In this case, the bestness of B is a reason that justifies choosing B (and 
forgoing E), but this reason does not justify choosing E.  One’s deeply held projects provide 
an independent (merely justifying) reason that justifies choosing E (and forgoing B), but it 
does not justify choosing B.  These reasons are at odds with one another.  They each justify 
choosing exactly one option, and they justify choosing distinct options.  By requiring that 
countervailing considerations have againstness and minimal independence, we have a natural 
way of tracking the structural difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2.  Figure 1 reasons 
provide moral and rational freedom, but do not countervail.  Figure 2 reasons countervail one 
another (and, depending on the nature of the reasons, may or may not provide moral and 
rational freedom). 
 
6.2. The Countervailing Considerations of Motivated Submaximization 
 We’ve just seen one difference between appropriate motivated submaximization and 
appropriate satisficing.  The former involves a reason that countervails one’s reason to choose 
the best, i.e., a reason that is against choosing the best and is minimally independent of one’s 
reason to choose the best.  The latter does not involve such reasons.  There is a further 
difference between the two, a difference concerning the kind(s) of countervailing 
considerations needed for appropriate motivated submaximization.   
 Suppose that I can bring Albert 50 units of well-being if I choose A, but I can bring Barry 
100 units if I choose B.  In this case, I presumably have a reason to choose A that is 
countervailed by my reason to choose B.  My reason to choose B is the 100 units it contains.  
This reason is against choosing A (because A only has 50 units), and it is minimally 
independent of my reason to choose A (because it consists in 50 more units than my reason to 
choose A).  Nonetheless, my reason to choose A and B are the same kind of reason: they both 
boil down to the promotion of well-being (or whatever good is at issue).  One is stronger than 
the other, but neither is independent of the promotion of the good. 
 In appropriate motivated submaximization, however, one’s countervailing consideration 
for rejecting the best must be independent of the promotion of well-being (or whatever good 
determines the ranking of one’s options).  Suppose that options are ranked solely by the 
degree of well-being they contain, so that the best option is the one that contains the highest 
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degree.  This degree of well-being provides a reason to choose the best option.  Since no 
smaller degree of well-being is minimally independent of the highest degree, no reason 
grounded in the promotion of well-being can countervail one’s reason to choose the best.  
Hence, appropriate motivated submaximization involves countervailing considerations that 
are at least partly independent of the promotion of well-being (or whatever good determines 
the ranking of one’s options).   
 Let’s return to the difference between appropriate motivated submaximization and 
appropriate satisficing.  Both share a common core.  They are committed to: 
Minimal Teleology: there is some good G, such that the pro tanto appropriateness of 
choosing an option is determined, at least in part, by the option’s degree of G and the 
degree of G had by the alternatives. 
In other words, both appropriate motivated submaximization and appropriate satisficing 
require that some reasons are grounded in the promotion of G.  They nonetheless require two 
distinct mechanisms for justifying suboptimal choice.  Defenders of motivated 
submaximization reject: 
Monogamy: there is some good G, such that the pro tanto appropriateness of choosing 
an option is determined solely by the option’s degree of G and the degree of G had 
by the alternatives. 
In the language of reasons, Monogamy claims that there is only one fundamental kind of 
reason, the kind concerned with the promotion of G.  Defenders of motivated 
submaximization claim that the appropriateness of one’s choice partly depends on something 
independent of G, e.g., the respect of rights.  They posit, in other words, another fundamental 
kind of reason that can compete with or condition or constrain reasons provided by the 
promotion of G.  When we have these competing reasons—these countervailing 
considerations—they can make it appropriate to choose less than the best with respect to G.   
 The defender of satisficing need not reject Monogamy.  He can say that that the 
appropriateness of a choice depends entirely on the degree of G exemplified by each option.  
He offers a distinct mechanism, Asymmetry, for making it possible to appropriately choose a 
suboptimal option.  Even if G is the only thing that matters for the appropriateness of a 
choice, Asymmetry says that not all degrees of G matter in the same way.   There are limits on 
what the good pro tanto demands of us.  While it (pro tanto) justifies the best, it (pro tanto) 
demands the mere good enough. 
 Appropriate submaximization requires Monogamy to be false but is neutral on 
Asymmetry.  Appropriate satisficing requires Asymmetry to be true but is neutral on 
Monogamy.  These are significant structural differences.  And these differences exist even 
though appropriate satisficing involves a reason to reject the best.  
 Bradley’s No Reason Objection to appropriate satisficing contends that when one 
satisfices, one has no reason to reject the best.  I have argued that this contention is false.  The 
goodness of a good enough suboptimal option provides a reason to choose that suboptimal 
option.  To be a reason that justifies choosing a suboptimal option is to be a reason that 
justifies rejecting all other alternatives, including the best.  Appropriate satisficing, then, 
involves a reason to reject the best.  Appropriate satisficing does not collapse into appropriate 
motivated submaximization for two reasons.  First, the latter involves countervailing 
considerations and the former does not.  When one appropriately satisfices, one’s reason to 
reject the best is neither against choosing the best, nor is minimally independent of one’s 
reason to choose the best. This is no mere verbal gymnastics.  By reserving the term 
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countervailing consideration for reasons that involve againstness and minimal independence, 
we are able to track interesting structural differences (recall Figure 1 and 2).  Second, 
appropriate motivated submaximization and appropriate satisficing require distinct 
mechanisms to justify suboptimal choice.  Appropriate motivated submaximization requires 
the existence of reasons that aren’t grounded in the promotion of the good.  In contrast, 
appropriate satisficing requires there to be limits on what the good pro tanto demands of us. 
 
7. Satisficing and Means-End Incoherence  
 The final objection to satisficing is that choosing a suboptimal option in the absence of 
countervailing considerations—e.g., as a way of optimizing some other, incommensurable 
good—must involve means-end incoherence (e.g., Byron 1998: 67-9; Dreier 2004: 152; 
Richardson 2004: 106-9).  Recall the case in which I can choose for my life to have 9 million 
and 1 units of well-being, there are no countervailing considerations, but I choose for it to 
have 9 million units instead.  If my ultimate aim in life is to make my life as well off as I can, 
my choice frustrates my ultimate aim.  This sort of means-end incoherence is widely thought 
to be irrational.  Byron (1998: 69) defines satisficing as choosing means to one’s end that are 
merely good enough and not the best.
21
  I agree that, in the absence of countervailing 
considerations, satisficing in Byron’s sense necessarily involves means-end incoherence.   
 Yet satisficing, as I defined it above, does not involve means-end incoherence.  If my 
ultimate aim is to get at least at least 9 million units of well-being for myself, my choice for 
less than the best (9 million rather than 9 million and 1) coheres with my ultimate aim, it gets 
me what I really want.  Satisficing understood in terms of aims might be necessarily 
inappropriate for various reasons, but means-end incoherence is not one of them.  (To prevent 
potential confusion: if my ultimate aim is to get at least 9 million units of well-being, there’s 
no incoherence in choosing the optimal option, assumed to be 9 million and 1.  Such a choice 
is a way of getting at least 9 million units and so coheres with my ultimate aim; however, it 
doesn’t count as satisficing because satisficing requires choosing a suboptimal option.) 
 Indeed, if means-end incoherence is a problem for anything at all, it’s a problem for 
motivated submaximization.  In general, it’s incoherent to aim at the optimum and then 
choose the suboptimal, but that’s exactly what motivated submaximization involves.  So how 
can motivated submaximization be appropriate?  The idea is that the countervailing 
consideration (e.g., the lack of an optimal option) makes it coherent to choose a suboptimal 
option even though one aims at the optimum.  Or, alternatively, the countervailing 
consideration prevents the incoherence from counting against the appropriateness of choosing 
an option.  I doubt means-end coherence is genuinely a problem for motivated 
submaximization.  My point is that there is one respect in which satisficing is better off than 
motivated submaximization: means-end incoherence is a potential problem only for motivated 
submaximization. 
 
Conclusion 
 Motivated submaximization and (radical) satisficing are importantly different ways of 
choosing a suboptimal option.
22
  To submaximize with motivation is to aim at the most good 
one can get but then choose a suboptimal option because of a countervailing consideration.  If 
such a choice can be appropriate, then Monogamy is false, i.e., it’s false that the 
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 Slote sometimes expresses sympathy with satisficing in Byron’s sense (e.g., 1989: 151). 
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 In my 2016, I show that this distinction has significant implications for the philosophy of religion. 
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appropriateness of one’s choice is solely a function of how good one’s options are.  To 
satisfice is to choose a suboptimal option because the option realizes one’s aim purely for its 
own sake at the (mere) good enough.  Appropriate satisficing is compatible with Monogamy, 
but it requires that there are limits on what the good (pro tanto) demands of us.  While it (pro 
tanto) justifies the best, it only (pro tanto) demands the mere good enough.   
 When satisficing is distinguished from motivated submaximization, it’s clear that the 
existing literature leaves (radical) satisficing in a very bad state.  Arguments for the 
appropriateness of satisficing tend to be better construed as arguments for the appropriateness 
of motivated submaximization.  Or, at best, these arguments show only that either satisficing 
or motivated submaximization can be appropriate.  Furthermore, the existing literature leaves 
unanswered the three most prominent objections to satisficing.   
 This paper leaves satisficing in a much better state by answering these objections.  The 
Insufficient Reason Objection fails, because its proponents never bother to defend its key 
premise, Necessity.  The No Reason Objection fails, because it falsely claims that appropriate 
satisficing does not involve a reason to reject the best.  The Incoherence Objection fails, 
because satisficing needn’t involve choosing means that frustrate one’s ends.  Indeed, if the 
Incoherence Objection is a problem for anything at all, it is a problem for motivated 
submaximization.   
 This paper identified the theoretical commitments of appropriate (radical) satisficing.  It 
showed that these commitments are coherent and worth serious consideration.  It did not, 
however, show that we should endorse those theoretical commitments.  That’s a task for 
another day.
23
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